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JURISDICTION 
Appellants offer the following response to Respondent's claim 
that this court lacks jurisdiction because Respondent's claim 
raises new material not addressed in the appellants' initial brief. 
Appellants have submitted to this Court a memorandum that sets 
forth their argument in support of this Court's jurisdiction. 
Below, that argument is set out in reply to Respondent's argument. 
I. THE ORTONS1 APPEAL IS NOT UNTIMELY BECAUSE THE PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW WAS FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THE FINAL 
AGENCY ACTION 
The Ortons1 appeal to this court is not untimely because their 
petition for judicial review was filed within thirty days of "the 
order constituting final agency action." Section 64-46b-14, Utah 
Code Ann. Section 64-46b-14(3)(a) states: 
A party shall file a petition for judicial 
review of final agency action within 30 days 
after the date that the order constituting the 
final agency action is issued or is considered 
to have been issued under subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
Section 63~46b-14, Utah Code Ann. 
Respondent contends that the final agency action occurred on 
October 14, 1992, twenty days after appellants filed their motion 
for reconsideration. See Brief of Respondent, at 2. The 
Respondent's position relies on § 6 3-46b-13 which states: 
If the agency head or the person designated 
for that purpose does not issue an order 
[granting or denying reconsideration] within 
20 days after the filing of the request, the 
request for reconsideration shall be 
considered to be denied. 
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Section 63-46b-13(3)(b), Utah Code Ann. 
It is undisputed that no response to appellants1 motion for 
reconsideration was filed within twenty days of their request for 
reconsideration. Instead, appellant contends that the Commission's 
order responding to appellants' petition for reconsideration super-
seded the presumption created by § 6 3-46b-13. It is this final 
order, issued December 9, 1992, which amended the Commission's 
original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision, 
that appellants appeal from. It is this order that was, in fact, 
the final agency action. Upon the issuance of this order, 
appellants had thirty days within which they could file a motion 
for judicial review. Section 63-46b-14, Utah Code. Ann. See also 
Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (appeal time commences when "final agency order" 
issues). Three factors support appellants' claim that the Order 
issued on December 9, 1992 and not the Final Decision issued by the 
Commission on September 4, 1992 was the final agency action from 
which appeal could be taken. 
First, the Order denying reconsideration made several amend-
ments to the Commission's earlier Final Decision. While it is true 
that the amendments affected only the Commission's finding of fact 
and not its decision, the Order did amend the Commission's earlier 
action. The Commission made changes to its findings of fact and 
then reiterated its first decision on the basis of those amended 
findings of fact. See Order, attached as Exhibit 2. The petition 
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for reconsideration was, therefore, granted in part and denied in 
part. Consequently, the Final Decision was superseded by the 
agency's final order. It was from this Order that the Ortons 
appealed. 
Second, the Commission's final Order is clearly the agency's 
final formal action as it meets the requirements set by § 6 3-46b-10 
of the Utah Code, for orders and decisions to be issued following 
formal proceedings. That section states specific items which must 
be included in an order to be filed by the presiding officer after 
a formal adjudicative proceeding. The section states that the 
officer shall sign and issue an order that includes: 
(a) A statement of the presiding officer's findings 
of fact based exclusively on the evidence of record in 
the adjudicative proceedings or on facts officially 
noted; 
(b) A statement of the presiding officer's 
conclusions of law; 
(c) A statement of the reasons for the presiding 
officer's decision; 
(d) A statement of any relief ordered by the 
agency; 
(e) A notice of the right to apply for 
reconsideration; 
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(f) A notice of any right to administrative or 
judicial review of the order available to aggrieved 
parties; and 
(g) The time limits applicable to any 
reconsideration or review. 
Section 63-46b-10, Utah Code Ann. 
The order issued by the Commission on December 9, 1992, 
contains each of these items, with the exception of a notice of the 
right to apply for reconsideration. See Order, attached as Exhibit 
1. The order is therefore not simply a denial of reconsideration, 
but is an official order issued following a formal adjudicative 
proceeding and constituting the agency's final action on the 
parties1 petition for review. 
Finally, the Commission acknowledged that the December 9 Order 
was its final action, by giving notice to appellants that they had 
30 days in which to file a request for judicial review. The notice 
included in the Commission's final order states "You have thirty 
(30) days after the date of the final order to file with the 
Supreme Court a petition for judicial review." See Order, attached 
as Exhibit 2. The Commission then cites § 6 3-46b-13(l) and 
§ 63-46b-14(2)(a) of the Utah Code. The Commission was obviously 
aware of the twenty-day presumption provided by § 63-46b-13. Their 
final order was issued more than twenty days after their original 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and final decision. The 
notation quoted above, therefore, can mean only that the court 
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recognized the order responding to the motion for reconsideration, 
and amending the earlier decision, to be its final action on the 
Ortons1 case. The Commission believed, as did the Ortons, that a 
petition for judicial review could follow this final agency action. 
The above factors, taken together, clearly indicate that the 
Commission's final action was to issue an order denying the 
appellants1 motion for reconsideration. As noted above, 
§ 6 3-46b-14 requires that a petition for judicial review be filed 
within thirty days of the "final agency action.11 Therefore, the 
appellants1 petition was timely, being filed twenty-nine days after 
the issuance of the Commission's order denying reconsideration. 
This court, therefore, has jurisdiction over the Ortons1 appeal 
from the Tax Commission's decision. 
II. EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS THE COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION TO BE 
THE ACTION FROM WHICH APPEAL WAS TO BE TAKEN SECTION 6 3-46B-13 
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO BAR THIS APPEAL WHERE THE AGENCY 
ACTED ON THE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION. 
Even if this court finds the Commission's Final Decision to be 
the action from which appeal was to be taken § 6 3-46b-13 should not 
be found to bar this appeal as the Tax Commission acted on the 
petition for reconsideration. It is not necessary for this court 
to give § 63-46b-13 a strict interpretation in order to meet the 
apparent purposes of the twenty-day presumption. A strict 
interpretation would compel an appellant to file for judicial 
review before receiving a response from the agency. Such a 
requirement is not necessary where, as here, the agency would 
suffer no prejudice as a result of a petitioner waiting for the 
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agency's final action on their case. In the instant case, the 
purposes of the twenty-day presumption can best be met by 
recognizing the right of petitioners to await the agency's action 
and to bring appeal from that final order. 
A. THE COMMISSION WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE 
ORTONS1 DECISION TO WAIT FOR A RESPONSE TO 
THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
There is no discussion in the notes to § 6 3-46b-13 or Utah 
case law as to the purpose of the twenty-day presumption. That 
purpose, however, can not and should not be to force an appellant 
to commence the appeal process without receiving response to their 
motion. Respondent suggests the presumption of denial was 
legislatively created in order to insure that the time for filing 
an appeal could not be indefinitely delayed. See Brief of 
Respondent, at 2. This conclusion seems reasonable. However, to 
apply that purpose to bar the Ortons from seeking judicial review 
is not reasonable. An agency to which a motion for reconsideration 
has been made may at any time issue an order simply denying that 
motion, and thereby commence the running of the thirty-day period 
set by § 63-46b-14. Logically, therefore, the twenty-day 
presumption can not be for the purpose of aiding the agency, as the 
agency is solely responsible for taking final action, on a 
petitioner's motion. Because of this power, the agency may at its 
discretion deny a motion for reconsideration in less than twenty 
days. Given the agency's authority to move a case towards judicial 
review, the presumption must be primarily for the benefit of the 
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appellant who wishes to seek judicial review following an 
unfavorable final decision by the agency but who first wants a 
reconsideration by the agency. The twenty-day presumption allows 
such a party to file for judicial review without having to wait for 
the agency to issue an order which does nothing more than deny the 
petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision. Further, because 
of the agency's power to issue a denial of reconsideration at any 
time, the agency cannot be prejudiced by an appellant's decision to 
wait for the final ruling. In contrast, a strict application of 
the twenty-day presumption would significantly prejudice 
petitioners who wait for a final response to their motion for 
reconsideration and eventually receive one that amends the earlier 
decision. In light of the disparity in the effect of a strict 
application of $ 6 3-46b-13 in this case, the court should 
interpret that section to allow a petitioner to wait for the 
agency's final action before commencing the appeal process. 
Finally, to require an appellant to begin the appeal process 
before the agency issues its final order creates the risk that two 
actions could be proceeding simultaneously. A strict interpreta-
tion of § 63-46b-13 creates the possibility that a motion for 
reconsideration would be granted after a petition for judicial 
review had been filed and the appeal process commenced. Such a 
situation would be duplicative and wasteful of judicial resources. 
Using the timesaving presumption created by <? 6 3-46b-13 to bar 
a party's appeal would thus be inequitable and wasteful. The 
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inequity of such an application is especially evident in this case. 
The Ortons filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 
1992, twenty days after the Tax Commission issued its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. Having presented 
specific points in support of their motion for reconsideration, the 
Ortons then waited for the Commission's response. The Ortons later 
received a response from the Commission that did more than simply 
deny reconsideration. The Commission in fact amended its earlier 
findings and entered a new order although without changing the 
earlier decision. The Commission thereby granted in part and 
denied in part the motion for reconsideration. See Order, attached 
as Exhibit 1. Following the Commission's final action, pursuant to 
§ 6 3-46b-14 the Ortons filed a petition for judicial review of the 
Commission's findings and decision. 
Dismissal of the Ortons' appeal would give the agency's non-
action precedence over its actions in amending the original 
findings of fact and issuing a final order denying reconsideration. 
This court should not take such a position. The Ortons filed a 
timely petition for review when measuring from the date of the 
agency's last actual action. While the twenty-day presumption is 
an effective method of facilitating review of agency action, it 
should not supersede and render moot the agency's later decisions 
to the detriment of petitioners. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Appellants believe there are no constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations the application of which 
would be solely determinative of the outcome of this case. Some 
statutes and rules are, however, directly relevant to the 
disposition of appeal. 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-10-103(1)(1) (1992): 
"Resident individual11 means: 
(i) an individual who is domiciled in this state for any 
period of time during the taxable year, but only for the 
duration of such period; or 
(ii) an individual who is not domiciled in this state but 
maintains a permanent place of abode in this state and 
spends in aggregate 183 or more days of the taxable year 
in this state . . . . 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-10-543 (1992): 
In any proceeding before the Commission under this 
chapter, the burden of proof shall be upon the 
petitioner . . . . 
Utah Code Annotated j? 63-46b-16 (1989): 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court 
or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review 
all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings . . . . 
(4) The Appellate Court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review 
has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
. . . . 
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; . . . . 
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(g) The agency action is based upon a determina-
tion of fact, made or implied by the agency, that 
is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court; 
(h) The agency action is: 
(i) An abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; . . . 
(iv) Otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Rules 
Utah Administrative Code Rule 865-9-2(1)(D) (1992): 
"Domicile" means the place where an individual has 
a true, fixed, permanent home and principal 
establishment, and to which place he has (whenever 
he is absent) the intention of returning. It is 
the place in which a person has voluntarily fixed 
the habitation of himself and family, not for a 
mere special or temporary purpose, but with the 
present intention of making a permanent home. 
After domicile has been established, two things are 
necessary to create a new domicile: first, an 
abandonment of the old domicile; and second, the 
intention and establishment of a new domicile. The 
mere intention to abandon a domicile once estab-
lished is not of itself sufficient to create a new 
domicile; for before a person can be said to have 
changed his domicile, a new domicile must be shown. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE FINDING OP THE TAX COMMISSION THAT WORTH 
ORTON WAS DOMICILED IN UTAH WAS UNREASONABLE 
AND AN IMPROPER INTERPRETATION OP THE LAW* 
Given the established legal definition of the term "domicile" 
and the entire record presented, the Tax Commission erred in 
finding Worth Orton remained domiciled in Utah. This court should 
review the Commission's finding under the correction of error stan-
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dard because in light of prior judicial decisions, the Commission 
erroneously interpreted statutory language. However, if this Court 
finds that the correction of error standard is not applicable in 
this case, then the Court should overturn the Commission's decision 
as an unreasonable finding not supported by substantial evidence• 
A. The Proper Standard of Review of the Commission's 
Interpretation of Law is Correction of Error. 
In light of the established legal definition of "domicile" the 
Commission erred in finding Worth Orton had remained domiciled in 
Utah during the years he lived in Nevada. The term "domicile" has 
been frequently defined by courts from many jurisdictions. See, 
e.g. , Allen v. Greyhound Lines, 583 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1978) 
(stating and applying common law definition of domicile); Blessley 
v. Blessley, 577 P.2d 62, 63 (N.M. 1978) (defining two factors to 
be considered in deciding domicile); Suglove v. Oklahoma Tax 
Commfn, 605 P.2d 1315, 1317 (Okla. 1979) (citing and applying 
"classic definition of domicile"). In fact, the definition relied 
on by the Tax Commission and set out at Rule 865-9-2(1) (D), Utah 
Administrative Code (1992) is simply a restatement of the common 
law definition of that term. See Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 
(1979), at 435; 28 C.J.S. Domicile, § 1 (1941). The Commission in 
reaching residence decisions is, therefore, doing no more than 
applying facts to established law. The proper standard of review 
for agency decisions interpreting or applying law is the correction 
of error standard. See King v. Industrial Commln/ 209 Ut.Adv.Rpts. 
33 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Nucor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 
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1296 (Utah 1992); Morton International Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 
581, 588-89 (Utah 1991) . 
Appellants recognize that under £ 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i), the 
reviewing court is to provide the agencyfs decision greater 
deference if the state legislature has granted an agency discretion 
in interpreting or administering the statute in question. If such 
discretion has been granted, the proper standard of review is the 
abuse of discretion standard. See § 6 3-46b-16, Utah Code Ann. 
(1992). Appellants contend, however, that no such grant of 
discretion has been provided to the Tax Commission for the purpose 
of interpreting established statutory definitions or prior case 
law. While the Respondent cites cases and statutes in support of 
its claim to a grant of discretion, these statutes and decisions 
are unpersuasive, in view of the fact that the Commission, in 
reaching decisions regarding domicile, must do so in a manner 
consistent with the legal definitions established by the courts 
where the statutory definition is consistent with those decisions. 
In such circumstances, the court is in as good a position as the 
agency to determine the meaning of the statutory language. 
Therefore, this court should review the Commission's decision under 
a correction of error standard granting no deference to the agency. 
Even if this court finds the Commission has been granted 
discretion in interpreting prior Utah decisions, statutory and 
administrative law, this Court should find the Commission's 
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. In light of 
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the evidence produced, it was not reasonable for the Commission to 
conclude Worth Orton maintained the state of Utah as his domicile 
during the time he lived in Nevada. 
B. Whatever the Standard of Review Applied by This Court, the 
Commission's Decision is Not Supported by Substantial 
Evidence. 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. At the hearing on 
this matter and in its brief, the Respondent made no effort to 
challenge or rebut the Ortons» statement of the facts concerning 
the last thirty-one years of their lives. In view of the basic 
agreement on the facts of this case, it is obvious the parties have 
simply reached different conclusions as to Worth Ortonfs state of 
residency. Appellants contend Respondent has reached an 
unreasonable conclusion that is not supported by the evidence. 
Worth Ortonfs actions show a pattern of meeting his 
responsibilities and maintaining contacts with Utah, the state 
where he lived for many years. The Respondent seems to suggest 
that Worth Orton should have abandoned these contacts and 
responsibilities in order to demonstrate that he truly intended to 
change his state of residence from Utah to Nevada. The Respondent 
also suggests that Worth Orton should have acquired additional real 
property in Nevada to indicate that he truly intended to remain in 
that state, because thirty-one years of residing in the same county 
in Nevada was insufficient to demonstrate residency in that state. 
The facts presented at the hearing on this matter establish 
Worth Orton continued to provide support for his wife although the 
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couple lived apart. Despite the uncontradicted evidence concerning 
the circumstances of the Ortonsf marriage, Worth did not obtain a 
divorce because of family wishes and personal reasons. He did, 
however, continue to provide support to his wife and to maintain 
two separate households. 
The facts presented at the hearing also indicate that Worth 
Orton chose to live inexpensively in Nevada so that he could 
provide support to his wife. He lived in a dormitory style 
apartment near his place of employment during the entire time that 
he worked in Mercury, Nevada. Respondent has made the claim that 
Worth Orton1s living accommodation was a dormitory, implying a 
transitory residence. The facts produced, however, indicate that 
Worth Orton chose to live in an apartment complex which offered 
maid service and access to prepared meals and not a "dormitory." 
Because the rent on his apartment was subsidized, he paid 
approximately twenty-one dollars per month to live there. The low 
cost of these living accommodations allowed Worth Orton to provide 
financial support to himself and his wife and to maintain both 
households. If Worth Orton had had a larger income or an indepen-
dent source of wealth, he may very well have purchased a second 
home. However, in light of his needs and resources, the twenty-one 
dollars per month dormitory style apartment was appropriate. 
It is also true that Worth Orton chose to visit family and 
friends in Utah at various times during each year. It is, however, 
undisputed that he spent the majority of those visits at a cabin in 
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Parowan, Utah, which he jointly owned with a long-time friend. 
Given the infrequency of these trips and the recreational purpose 
of most of them, it is obvious that Worth Orton did not "commute" 
from Mercury, Nevada to Parawon, Utah. 
It is also agreed that Worth Orton retained ownership of 
certain properties in Utah during the time he lived in Nevada. 
However, that he did not maintain any of these properties for 
residence purposes has been established by the evidence. Testimony 
provided at the hearing established that Worth Orton1s wife lived 
in the family home and that he rarely visited there. Further, 
after a number of years in Nevada, he transferred title to her 
name. Worth Orton also owned two parcels of property he had 
inherited from his family and one piece of land he had purchased 
for investment purposes but never developed. The only other real 
property in which he had an interest was the cabin in Parowan, Utah 
that he jointly owned with a friend and which he visited during 
various vacations. These continuing connections do not indicate 
that Worth Orton intended to retain his Utah domicile. The 
connections indicate only that Worth Orton retained certain ties to 
the state of Utah during the time that he resided in Nevada. 
The other points Respondent uses to support the Commission's 
conclusion are minor and prove nothing about his state of domicile. 
Where one obtains infrequent dental care and where one intends to 
be interred are not of sufficient importance to counter the plain 
evidence of Worth Orton's residence for more than twenty years in 
15 
Mercury, Nevada. The evidence produced by the parties is, there-
fore, simply insufficient to support the conclusion that Worth 
Orton remained a resident of Utah despite his stated intent to 
abandon his Utah domicile and his more than twenty years of 
residence in Nevada. 
In addition, the Commission's decision is not supported by the 
case law Respondent cites in defense of the finding that, despite 
his decades-long residence in Nevada, Worth Orton never established 
a domicile in that state. The one case cited by Respondent in 
support of its position on Worth Orton's residency is notably 
unpersuasive. In Blessley v. Blessley, 577 P.2d 62 (N.M. 1978), 
the court considered the domicile of a soldier who lived in three 
different states during his twenty-seven-year military career. In 
that case, the court stated that the ultimate facts necessary to 
sustain a conclusion of domicile are physical presence in a state 
and intention to make that state one's home. IcL at 63. The court 
also stated the well-established and directly applicable rule that 
the domicile of Armed Forces personnel is not determined by where 
they are stationed. IcL The court also expressed its belief that 
military personnel should be allowed to purchase property where 
they are stationed without being forced to abandon their former 
domicile. Id. at 64. Given this belief, the court would not force 
a domicile change upon plaintiff Blessley who contended he had 
never intended to change his domicile. Id. at 63. The court's 
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decision turned primarily on the soldier's stated intention with 
regard to his state of domicile. Id. 
In the present case, no such presumption regarding the effect 
of re-location is applicable. However, the factors cited by the 
court—presence in a state and the intention of making that state 
one's home—are applicable. Worth Orton has stated that his intent 
was to change his domicile from Utah to Nevada and that he took 
efforts to make that change. In addition, it is undisputed that he 
was present in the state of Nevada and had a fixed home there for 
more than twenty years. The Blessley case is therefore easily 
distinguishable from the facts of this case and is not supportive 
of Respondent's position. The Respondent relies on no other case 
law to support its argument that Worth Ortonfs presence in Nevada, 
his stated intention to become a resident of that state, and the 
testimony provided are not sufficient to demonstrate he established 
a Nevada domicile. Instead, Respondent relies only on its claim of 
agency discretion to support the Commission's finding that Worth 
Orton remained domiciled in Utah despite his presence in Nevada and 
intent to change his domicile. That conclusion is not, however, 
supported by the evidence produced by the parties. The 
Commission's decision, not being supported by substantial evidence, 
must be overturned. 
The appellants made an expanded argument against the 
Commission's decision in their initial brief. As no new material 
has been introduced by Respondents brief, appellants will simply 
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reiterate their original argument by reference. Appellants contend 
Worth Orton1s actions indicate his intention to establish himself 
as a Nevada domiciliary. Had Worth Orton been a wealthier man, he 
might have purchased a Nevada home. Had he been a less responsible 
man, he might have divorced and abandoned his wife. Partly because 
he took neither of these actions, Worth Orton is claimed to have 
remained a Utah resident. That claim, and the Commission's 
conclusion that followed from it are not supported by the evidence. 
This Court should, therefore, correct the Commission's error and 
dismiss the assessment of taxes and interest against the Ortons. 
II. 
EVEN IS THIS COURT DETERMINES WORTH ORTON WAS 
DOMICILED IN UTAH, THE COMMISSION ERRED IN 
DETERMINING IT SHOULD NOT BE ESTOPPED PROM 
ASSESSING TAXES AGAINST THE ORTONS FOR THE 
PERIOD IN QUESTION. 
In light of the facts produced in this case, the Commission 
erred in determining it should not be estopped from assessing taxes 
against the Ortons for the period in question. Worth Orton relied 
on tax documents produced by the Tax Commission and 1980 represen-
tations by auditors in concluding he owed no Utah State taxes. The 
finding of tax liability and collection from him of back taxes and 
interest years after the tax was owed is indeed a detriment. Worth 
Orton has saved for his retirement. He did not save to pay the Tax 
Commission a debt its employees long ago found he did not owe. 
Under the facts of this case, estoppel is justified. Beyond these 
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statements, appellants have nothing more to add to the argument in 
their initial brief. 
III. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO ABATE ALL 
PRE-1988 INTEREST ACCRUALS. 
The Commission erred in failing to abate all pre-1988 interest 
accruals. The Respondent claims appellants mis-characterized the 
facts and law and asked for charity on the issue of interest 
abatement. As Respondent did not see fit to provide specifics in 
support of its claim of mischaracterization, appellants cannot 
answer this claim. Appellants can, however, respond to the claim 
they are seeking charity by stating that they seek only consistency 
and fairness in asking for an abatement of the interest that 
accrued as a result of the Tax Commission's mistakes. Appellant 
Worth Orton asks only that the Court exercise its equitable powers 
to free him from the burden now imposed as a result of the Tax 
Commission's lackadaisical, stumbling collection efforts. 
It is not disputed that in 1980, the Tax Commission contacted 
Worth Orton and told him he owed back taxes. After communications 
with the Commission, Worth Orton was told that the matter would be 
looked into and that someone would contact him again about the 
debt. Worth Orton was not contacted again until 1988. The 
Commission suggests that during this nearly eight-year hiatus, 
during which the Commission failed to inform him of his tax 
liability, Worth Orton should have simply paid resident taxes to a 
state other than the one in which he lived. Such a suggestion is 
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not reasonable. No taxpayer can expect the Tax Commission to 
forego collection of taxes they are owed. Worth Orton knew the 
Commission had notice of the fact he was not paying Utah State 
taxes. Consequently, he could reasonably expect that the 
Commission would inform him if they concluded, upon review, that he 
should begin paying Utah income taxes. Appellants, therefore, do 
not ask for charity from the Commission, only for an abatement of 
interest that accrued as a result of the Commission's faulty 
follow-up and collection procedures. Appellants contend that such 
an abatement is proper and should be ordered on the same grounds as 
the Commission's order abating post-1987 interest accruals. 
Beyond these comments, appellants have nothing to add to the 
argument in their initial brief. All interest accruals prior to 
January 1, 1988 should be abated. Such an abatement would be fair 
in light of the facts presented by this case. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above facts, appellants contend this Court 
should apply a correction of error standard of review and overturn 
the Commission's decision as an incorrect interpretation of the 
law. Even if this Court grants deference to the Commission's 
decision, that decision should be overturned as not supported by 
substantial evidence. In addition, under the facts of this case, 
estoppel could properly be applied to bar the Tax Commission's 
assessment. Finally, even if this court does not grant estoppel in 
appellants' favor, an abatement of all interest accruals is 
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justified as Worth Orton relied on the Tax Commission's findings in 
choosing not to file Utah State tax returns during all the years in 
question. 
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